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T he recent Black Lives Matter protests saw tens of thousands of Australians marching in support of the families of First 
Nation people calling for an end to First 
Nation deaths in custody and to the per-
ceived lack of accountability of involved 
officers. 
More than 400 Aboriginal and Torres 
Strait Islander people have died in police 
custody since the end of the Royal Com-
mission into Aboriginal Deaths in Cus-
tody in 1991. During that time, only a 
handful of cases have resulted in prosecu-
tion, the most high-profile of which was 
the prosecution of Chris Hurley for the 
death of Mulrunji Doomadgee on Palm 
Island in 2004 (more recently charges 
have been laid in relation to the shooting 
death of 19-year-old Kumanjayi Walk-
er in Yeundemu in November 2019 and 
the shooting death of 29-year-old Joyce 
Clarke in September 2019). 
One obstacle to prosecution in such deaths is a reticence on 
the part of those involved (including police or prison witness-
es) to give full and frank accounts of what happened.  
To understand how that occurs, it is necessary to understand 
the steps that are mandated in law where a death in custody 
occurs, for which we will take New South Wales as a fair 
example. All deaths in police or corrective services custody 
must be reported to the Coroner (Coroners Act 2009 (NSW), 
s 35(1)(a) and Crimes (Administration of Sentences) Act 1999 
(NSW), s 74). New South Wales Police then conduct an 
investigation on behalf of the State Coroner in accordance 
with the obligations set out in the NSW Police Force Criti-
cal Incident Guiding Principles (The author has written else-
where about the problems inherent in such arrangements, see: 
theconversation.com/police-investigators-too-in-house-to- 
probe-deaths-in-custody-838). As part of that investigation, 
inter alia, police attempt to interview the individuals involved 
in the death. Having collated the evidence, police present it 
to the Coroner and when the Coroner is satisfied the brief is 
sufficient, an inquest is conducted. Two 
recent decisions: the Inquest into the 
death of Rebecca Maher (4 March 2019) 
('Maher') and Bell v Deputy Coroner of 
South Australia [2020] SASC 59 (‘Bell ’), 
demonstrate the tensions that can arise 
between the State’s entitlement (on be-
half of the public) to examine conten-
tious deaths via the Coronial process 
and the attempts by witnesses to refuse 
to answer questions that could lead to 
negative consequences. 
Inquest into the death of Rebecca 
Maher (4 March 2019)  
Ms Rebecca Maher was a 36-year-old 
Wiradjuri woman who died in a cell at 
the Maitland police station on 19 July 
2016 after being taken into ‘protective 
custody’ by police. Because Ms Maher 
had not been arrested for an offence, po-
lice were not obligated to advise the Aboriginal Legal Service 
Custody Notification Service (‘CNS’) - the telephone assis-
tance service that was implemented in response to the Recom-
mendations of the Royal Commission into Aboriginal Deaths 
in Custody (see Inquest into the death of Rebecca Maher, 5 July 
2019 at [210] (‘July Findings’). It is worth noting that the 
CNS is a potentially life-saving service. Since its inception, no 
First Nation person had died in police custody in New South 
Wales, that is until Ms Maher, and in her case, police failed 
to notify the service. Ms Maher died in a police cell of ‘respi-
ratory depression after loss of consciousness caused by mixed 
drug toxicity and possibly aspiration of vomit’ (July Findings 
at [272]), about five hours after being detained. The Coroner 
ultimately found, inter alia, that: given her level of intoxica-
tion Ms Maher should have been taken directly to hospital 
(July Findings at [259]); the police’s failure to call an ambu-
lance was in breach of NSW Police policy (July Findings at 
[257](e)) and Ms Maher ‘would have survived’ if an ambu-
lance had been called (July Findings at [257](d)). 
• The recent Black Lives Matter 
protests have demonstrated 
a public concern with First 
Nation deaths in custody 
and the effectiveness of 
existing legal mechanisms of 
accountability.   
• The Coroner’s office has 
a statutory function to 
investigate the manner 
and cause of deaths, and a 
statutory obligation to do 
so for First Nation deaths in 
custody.  
• Two recent decisions in 
New South Wales and South 
Australia have examined the 
legal principles that apply to 
objections to give evidence by 
the officers involved.   
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Police reluctance to participate in interviews for the 
Coroner 
During the coronial investigation into Ms Maher’s death, four 
police officers were identified as ‘involved officers’ (officers 
thought to have contributed to the incident under investiga-
tion). Those officers were directed by Senior Police (pursuant 
to clause 8(1) of the Police Regulation 2015 (NSW)) to partic-
ipate in recorded interviews with coronial investigators. The 
officers did so after reading prepared statements to the effect 
that they were only participating in the interviews because 
of the direction and not ‘of their own free will’, that they 
objected to the interviews being provided to anyone outside the 
Police Force or being admitted into evidence in any inquest, 
and that they claimed ‘derivative’ immunity (see: Inquest into 
the death of Rebecca Maher - Decision on inclusion of directed 
interviews in brief at [6]-[7], published 4 March 2019) (‘March 
Findings’). Prior to the commencement of the inquest, the 
officers objected to the use of the interviews on the basis that, 
inter alia, it would be ‘unfair’ (March Findings at [48]). 
Acting State Coroner O’Sullivan rejected that submission. 
Her Honour noted that the combined statutory framework of 
the Coroners Act 2009 (NSW), the Police Act 1990 (NSW), 
and the Police Regulation 2015 (NSW) (along with the Police 
Critical Incident Guidelines), sanctioned both the directions 
and consequent interviews. Consequently, there could be no 
unfairness in their use (March Findings and applying DPP v 
Attallah [2001] NSWCA 171). 
The Maher finding is a welcome one for public accountabili-
ty. The Coroner’s ability to investigate the circumstances of a 
death in custody depends on both the ability of coronial inves-
tigators to interview witnesses and on the public examination 
of their evidence during the inquest process. The alternative 
fails to give sufficient weight to the interest of the public in 
holding accountable those who exercise executive power on 
their behalf. 
Bell v Deputy Coroner of South Australia [2020] 
SASC 59 (‘Bell’).
A related question arose recently in South Australia in relation 
to the death in custody of Wayne ‘Fella’ Morrison who died 
three days after being restrained and placed face-down in a 
prison van in September 2016. Mr Morrison was a Wiradjuri, 
Kookatha and Wirrangu man, who was being held on remand 
whilst awaiting a court appearance by video-link. 
The seven guards inside the prison van all objected to giving 
evidence on the basis that ‘no meaningful questions could 
be answered without fear of the prison guards incriminating 
themselves’ (www.abc.net.au/news/2018-12-05/guards-fight-
giving-evidence-at-wayne-morrison-inquest/10585126). The 
Coroner found that the privilege against exposure to a civ-
il penalty (‘penalty privilege’) was not available under the 
Coroners Act 2003 (SA). That finding was challenged in the 
Supreme Court as constituting jurisdictional error. What the 
Supreme Court ultimately had to determine, inter alia, was 
whether the penalty privilege was available under the Coro-
ners Act 2003 (SA). In his judgment, Blue J noted that, whilst 
ultimately the question will be one of construing the appro-
priate statute, what is less clear is whether one starts from 
the proposition that penalty privilege does not apply in non- 
curial settings unless the subject Act recognises or creates it, or, 
the penalty privilege applies in non-curial proceedings unless 
the subject Act abrogates it by ‘express provision or necessary 
intendment’ (at [156] citing Pyneboard Pty Ltd v Trade Prac-
tices Commission (1983) 152 CLR 328. See also his Honour’s 
discussion at [135]-[195]). Holding that any tension in the 
authorities should be resolved by the High Court (at [163]), 
Blue J adopted the latter approach in his analysis, holding the 
Coroners Act 2003 (SA) did not abrogate the penalty privilege 
by ‘an express provision or necessary intendment’ and that it 
therefore applied (at [195]). One can compare this approach 
with the characterisation (in obiter) of the Federal Court in 
Trade Practices Commission v Abbco Iceworks Pty Ltd (1994) 52 
FCR 96 where it said:
‘[I]f penalty privilege is to apply in a non-curial setting, it must 
be found to do so from the language of the provisions in ques-
tion. Such a finding must be found in the face of the view of a 
majority of the High Court in Daniel’s doubting that penalty 
privilege ordinarily applies in a non-curial setting at all’ (at [52]). 
With respect, in the author’s view, Blue J’s decision may create 
significant difficulties for the office of the Coroner in South 
Australia and points to a need to clarify the Coroners Act 2003 
(SA) as to the availability of the penalty privilege. The Coroners 
Act 2003 (SA) contains no reference to, or definition of, ‘civ-
il penalty’. Where that term has been interpreted in this con-
text in other jurisdictions however it has been held to include 
‘orders disciplining police officers, such as financial penalties, 
reductions in rank and dismissal from office (Police Service 
Board v Morris (1985) 156 CLR 397 at 403 and 408' (as cited in 
Wallers Coronial Law and Practice in New South Wales [61.6])). 
In almost every First Nation death in custody the author has 
been involved with, there have been breaches of internal poli-
cies that could ground some form of disciplinary proceedings. 
In those circumstances, the consequence of Bell is that:
(a) Witnesses can simply refuse to answer investigators’ ques-
tions on the basis of penalty privilege*. Given inquests can take 
three years or longer before they even commence, witness rec-
ollections could degrade substantially and the families of those 
who have died will be faced with silence for that time; and 
(b) Inquests could take much longer and be more complex. 
Given the potentially broad range of consequences that could 
fall within the undefined concept of ‘penalty’, inquests could 
become ‘bogged’ down in numerous objections, submissions 
and rulings on whether the penalty privilege applies (particu-
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larly where, generally, global objections to giving evidence in 
inquests are not available (see for example, Accident Insurance 
Mutual Holdings Ltd v McFadden (1993) 31 NSWLR 412; Cor-
rell v AG (NSW) (2007) 180 A Crim R 212). Any increase in the 
length and complexity of inquests should be avoided given the 
substantial delay already evident in the Coronial jurisdiction.
Indeed the work of the Coroner’s Court in South Austra-
lia may well ‘grind to a halt’ as reportedly foreshadowed by 
Deputy Coroner Jayne Basheer in her first instance decision 
(at [194]). One hopes this does not occur, given the impact that 
the already substantial delays have upon First Nation families 
(see: theguardian.com/australia-news/2019/aug/25/why-does-
it-take-so-long-the-desperate-wait-for-answers-after-a-death-in-
custody). Moreover, obvious and critical questions arise about 
the utility of accountability mechanisms that can take years to 
identify misconduct by police and prison officers who will, in the 
interim, continue to be responsible for people in custody. 
Why it matters
The 1991 Royal Commission into Aboriginal Deaths in Cus-
tody (‘RCIADIC’) noted the importance of proper investi-
gation of deaths in custody to ensure that such deaths occur 
in the ‘common course of nature’ and not ‘by some unlaw-
ful violence or unreasonable hardship put on him by those 
under whose power he was while confined. There should 
not be given an opportunity for asserting that matters with 
regards to deaths in public institutions are “hushed up”’ 
(Report on the death of John Pilot by Commissioner Wyvill, 
cited at [4.7.2] of RCIADIC, National Report, Vol 1, 4.7 
Conclusion). Police and prison officers are amongst those who 
represent the physical manifestation of the State’s lawful and 
coercive force. Officers should be required to answer questions 
about how they exercise such force, particularly when someone 
has died in their custody. The Coroner’s inquest is one of the 
ways in which those answers are sought. An officer should not 
be entitled to refuse to provide answers because of a threat of a 
civil penalty such as termination of employment. In The Police 
Service Board and Another v Russell John Morris/Robert Colin 
Martin (1985) 156 CLR 397, Brennan J (in another context) 
referred in his judgment to ‘the incompatibility of a claim of 
privilege with the duty of a police officer to reveal information 
acquired in the course of his duty’. In doing so he references 
the following extract from a United States judgment:
‘Duty required them to answer. Privilege permitted them to 
refuse to answer. They chose to exercise the privilege, but the 
exercise of such privilege was wholly inconsistent with their duty 
as police officers. They claim that they had a constitutional right 
to refuse to answer under the circumstances, but ... they had 
no constitutional right to remain police officers in the face of 
their clear violation of the duty imposed upon them.’ (Christal v 
Police Commission of San Francisco 92 P.2d 416 (1939), at p 419).
This is the nub of the issue and something that is often raised 
by First Nation families who acutely recognise the hypocri-
sy of that position. In this writer’s view, a more appropriate 
balance of these competing interests lies in provisions such as 
ss 58 and 61 of the Coroners Act 2009 (NSW) which preserve 
the ability of the Coroner to compel evidence from witness-
es, but do so on the condition, inter alia, of the provision of 
a certificate that prohibits such evidence being used in any 
NSW court. The protection is not complete. It does not pro-
hibit its use in non-judicial forums (for example, in relation to 
some disciplinary offences). Nonetheless, it can be obtained 
whilst protecting the witness from criminal prosecutions. In 
contrast, at least in South Australia, the Bell decision means 
that the privilege, if founded, can be claimed as a complete 
objection to providing evidence. 
Conclusion
Notwithstanding the fact that none of those prison guards 
who were with Mr Morrison during his last moments are fac-
ing charges, the consequence of the Bell decision is that when 
the inquest resumes some three or more years after Mr Morri-
son’s death, those officers will more easily be able to insist (at 
least substantially) on silence as a response to both the fami-
lies and the Coroner’s demand for answers. To allow prison or 
police officers to avoid admitting to serious breaches of policy 
in order to protect them from disciplinary proceedings does 
little to instil confidence that the State is serious about tack-
ling First Nation deaths in custody. 
*On a related note, it was reported on 16 June that the lead applicant in 
Bell intends to claim penalty privilege as a basis for refusing to answer 
any questions at the inquest when it resumes (mobile.abc.net.au/
news/2020-06-16/wayne-morrison-prison-guards-refuse-to-answer-
questions/12360414).
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Police and prison officers are amongst 
those who represent the physical 
manifestation of the State’s lawful 
and coercive force. Officers should be 
required to answer questions about how 
they exercise such force, particularly 
when someone has died in their 
custody. The Coroner’s inquest is  
one of the ways in which those  
answers are sought. 
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